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There are several complications in the geographies of children and young people, 
and in all social science, including the following three questions.   
How can we resolve disagreements and even contradictions between empirical, 
evidence-based, factual, statistical research, versus interpretive and social 
constructionist research into contingent beliefs, behaviors and values?  
How can we understand and respect each local culture, and yet not fall into mere 
description and cultural relativism?  
Limited micro observational studies of children can be superficial and misleading if 
they ignore powerful macro causes that shape children’s lives. How can short 
studies, without the time and resources of international longitudinal research such as 
Young Lives, take due well-grounded account of such macro causal powers as 
global politics and economics?  
The chapter will outline concepts in critical realism and relate them to research 
reports about children from around the world, in order to show how the concepts help 
to resolve these problems. The concepts are especially relevant at the stages of 
designing research projects and later of analyzing and interpreting data. The 
concepts include: being and knowing; intransitive and transitive; theory/practice 
contradictions; social science and philosophy; the epistemic fallacy; the possibility of 
naturalism; closed and open systems; polyvalence; depth realism; structure and 
agency; natural necessity; power; predicting the future; absence, change and 
emergence; macro and micro levels in research; four planar social being; and a four 
stage process of analysis that will be discussed later. 
[A heading] Introduction: Problems in social science  
 
Natural scientists broadly agree with one another on their theories and methods. 
Although there is much debate about the precise and rigorous use of methods, and 
about the validity of the findings, there is still major consensus about the following: 
empirical research methods (based on evidence gained through the five senses); 
positivism (proving hypotheses empirically); validity and the search for reliable 
generalizable findings; fallibility (skeptically testing and retesting hypotheses); 
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technology (as the practical means of conducting and applying replicable scientific 
research); and policy (it should be based on sound, unbiased scientific evidence).  
Quantitative and statistical social researchers tend to accept these certainties. For 
example, they may assume that standards in schools across the world can be 
verified and compared accurately, as long as rigorous tests are precisely conducted 
with each specific age group. An example is the Program for International Student 
Assessment (PISA, 2012) which tested a sample of 510,000 students selected from 
28 million 15-year olds from 70 “economies” or countries. The students’ recorded 
replies are taken as direct and valid evidence of their learning, in standardized 
formats that are measured and compared. Hypotheses about which educational 
methods are most successful are tested and then retested regularly. The global 
results, obtained through massive computerized programs, are taken to support valid 
education policies. And these are implemented through new teaching technologies 
and materials, both printed and virtual. Many materials are supplied through 
multinational corporations, such as Rupert Murdoch’s Harper Collins.  
However, social science is complicated by disagreements between empirical and 
interpretive researchers. Many interpretive social scientists contest the above 
certainties. They deny scientism, the notion that natural and social science methods 
can be identical. “Rigor”, they argue, can be an empty aim, when strictly 
standardized methods do not fit the complex variety of social life. “Validated” 
findings, claimed to be generalizable, replicable, and therefore predictable, also 
ignore this social complexity. People, unlike chemical elements, are unpredictable 
agents. Students might be enthusiastic or afraid or confused when tested. They 
might be disadvantaged when required to work in their second or third language. 
They may have been intensively coached or else neglected by teachers. There is 
therefore no inevitable, direct link between children’s test results and their ability and 
potential. And when students vary so much, the relatively small samples can easily 
misrepresent each nation. “Empirical” research methods that rely on the five senses 
do not allow for tacit social interactions, contingent meanings, implicit values, or 
invisible social pressures and policies. Yet when power invades and “governs the 
soul” it is most powerful when it is least visible and cannot easily be identified or 
challenged (Lukes, 2005; Rose, 1989).   
  Geographers have shown how social contexts and customs vary immensely around 
the world. Test questions can therefore be clear in one language but obscure in 
another; a single word can have very different meanings and associations. There are 
also moral and political complications in projects such as PISA. Some countries 
might seem to be highly successful when the governments allow testing only in elite 
schools or put pressure on teachers to alter the students” replies. There are further 
problems in the methods. How can a small sample of students be representative? 
How and why are the exam questions chosen, and how can the choice be fair and 
equally relevant and meaningful to students in every country? Inevitably questions 
will favor some cultures over others, whereas should we not respect cultural 
diversity? How do cheap, fast, automated methods of mass testing change 
education, so that teachers “teach to the test”. Teaching is then reduced and 
fragmented into pass/fail notions of correct replies to specific, easily scored, closed 
questions (Scott, 2010), instead of encouraging individual students’ critical and 
imaginative discovery and new thinking. Education risks being reduced wholly into a 
commodity, to be bought by parents and students in order to promote the students’ 
future earning power. This can leave little time or interest in education’s other crucial 
3 
 
aspects, such as to promote critical democracy, and concern with justice and 
personal fulfillment, concepts that cannot be standardized or easily tested. 
These are a few of many complications in social research, which raise doubts about 
natural science models of proving hypotheses empirically to supply unbiased 
scientific evidence as a sound basis for policies, practices and technological 
developments. Interpretivists who are sensitive to these complexities regard 
empiricists as rather simplistic or naive for seeming to ignore them. In turn, 
empiricists question the value and purpose of interpretive research when it describes 
particular examples but does not generalize or produce sound evidence for 
politicians and practitioners to apply. When empirical and interpretive social 
scientists disagree on their basic tenets they can hardly all convince politicians or the 
general public that their work is worth taking seriously. Some consensus which 
increases the coherence and credibility of social science is therefore urgently 
needed.        
This chapter will draw on ideas that are much more fully developed in Bhaskar 
(1998, 2008), Yoshida (2011) and Alderson (2013). It will review ways in which deep 
assumptions held by empirical researchers are defined in contradiction to those held 
by interpretive researchers. It will outline approaches towards resolving the 
contradictions, drawing on the strengths of each side, and overcoming weaknesses 
and omissions. This chapter will examine how we can understand and respect each 
local culture, and yet move beyond description and cultural relativism towards critical 
and comparative analyses that can inform policies to benefit children. This will avoid 
relativism that vetoes moral judgments and critical analysis of power, and also 
vetoes comparisons of children’s differing wellbeing, and normative conclusions 
intended to benefit people (Lukes, 2008).  
Concepts in critical realism to be reviewed, which help to resolve problems and 
contradictions in the theories, design and analysis of research with children around 
the world, include:  being and knowing; intransitive and transitive; theory/practice 
contradictions; social science and philosophy; the epistemic fallacy; the possibility of 
naturalism; closed and open systems; polyvalence; depth realism; structure and 
agency; natural necessity; power; predicting the future; absence, change and 
emergence; macro and micro levels in research; four planar social being; and MELD.  
 
 
[A heading] Seven contradictions between positivism and interpretivism 
 
Positivist and empirical researchers tend to assume the following seven tenets about 
their data, such as international comparisons of school students’ PISA scores. The 
scores and indeed childhood itself, as in its Piagetian approach to developmental 
stages, can consist of: (1) objective self-evident facts separated from values; (2) 
these are understood apart from their social context and as separate variables; (3) 
they are independent and pristine, so that whoever observes, records, reports or 
reads about them sees the same fact. (4) Their essential inherent qualities and (5) 
stable lasting reality “out there” in the world can remain unchanged when transferred 
across time and space. (6) Positivist social research, modeled on the natural 
sciences, can therefore discover general laws, replicable findings and reliable 
predictions. (7) This confidence encourages assumptions that “evidence based” 
findings can provide self-evident conclusions about causes and effects in social life, 
which support effective solutions to public and private problems.   
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Despite the variety among interpretive childhood researchers’ theories (for example, 
hermeneutic, ethnographic, phenomenological, postmodern, post-structural), they 
are more or less likely to fit into the following summary. However, the next seven 
points tend to contradict the seven previous ones. Interpretivism cautiously treats 
phenomena (again such as PISA scores or stages of childhood) as if they are: (1) 
constructed or generated by subjective human perceptions and values and 
negotiated interactions, (2) within specific social contexts and cultures. (3) 
Phenomena are contingent, and depend on our individual social selves and 
perceptions, (4) as if phenomena have few or no essential, inherent qualities and (5) 
no independent, lasting truth or reality of their own that could transfer intact across 
time and space. They do not exist “out there” in the world, but only through the social 
institutions and cultures that give them meaning. (6) Interpretivism recognizes 
dynamic unpredictable human agency, freed from biological, historical, economic or 
religious determinism. (7) Connections between research data, conclusions, 
recommendations and later policy making may be tenuous claims and constructions 
rather than self evident conclusions.  
 
   
[A heading] Towards resolving the contradictions 
 
These deep contradictions complicate the work of social scientists, such as 
children’s geographers. How can we convince critics, including our colleagues in 
rival sub-disciplines, that our work provides valid findings to inform academic, 
political, practitioner and public understanding of children around the world? How 
can we really know about children’s and young people’s views and experiences, 
needs and rights? The next sections briefly outline a few of the ways in which critical 
realism works to resolve these contradictions and to strengthen and validate social 
science theories, methods and findings. 
 
 
[B heading] Being and knowing         
 
Critical realism resolves these contradictions between facts and perceptions in 
several ways. First, it clearly separates ontology (factual being) from epistemology 
(perceptual knowing). For example, real children, who actually play in fields, learn at 
school or work in street markets (ontology), differ from observers’ perceptions of 
them (epistemology). Whereas children are physical and social beings, childhood is 
a set of theories about what children and their relations with adults are, or could, or 
should be like. To confuse “children” and “childhood”, using them as interchangeable 
terms, is to blur this vital difference between realities and theories. Intransitive being 
needs to be distinguished clearly from our varied and shifting transitive thoughts and 
perceptions.   
Social constructionists such as Latour and Woolgar (1979) would contend that 
everything comes down to our perceptions: through them we experience and actually 
construct “reality’. This is partly true, our understanding and behaviors are 
immensely influenced by contingent and often perhaps fallible perceptions, our own 
and those of other people. The great variety of childhoods around the world 
illustrates the power of local beliefs and customs. This view may be taken to 
extremes to assert, first, that no child has an inner essential reality or, second, that 
even if such a reality exists we can never truly know or prove it. We do not have valid 
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grounds of knowing what we know. Instead, it is averred that it is more accurate to 
see individuals and their experiences and relationships wholly in terms of their 
contingent beliefs. And if we could peel away the local layers of the onion of any 
individual identity, we would not find any essential centre left.  
Critical realists would reply to the first point: each child has unique, real, biological, 
genetic, historical origins and continuing social being: the heart constantly beats; 
there were specific birth parents; children live in particular material housing and 
neighborhoods, on actual daily resources that provide their food and clothing. Phil 
Mizen and Yaw Ofosu-Kusi (2012) draw on critical realism when discussing their 
analysis of photographs taken by children in the slums of Accra Ghana. They 
consider that it is not “naive” to take the street children’s experiences and images as 
real instead of as only subjective social constructions. This is partly because the 
photos cannot be made by the viewer to mean simply anything and to have no 
inherent truth or reality. The photos have specific meanings that powerfully convey 
the “flatness” of real working children’s “wageless lives”.  
That photography is so adept as record and memorial is testament to its 
powers of close description and capacity to initiate historical recall, an ability 
to affirm the existence, fabric and texture of other people's lives in all their 
unfamiliar, edifying or pitiless forms. To fictionalize this function, as visual 
ethnographers are now encouraged to do, is to risk disabling these powers 
and possibly to concede that unforgiving worlds like those inhabited by our 
working children, together with the creativity with which they confront them, 
are merely a matter of invention  (Mizen and Ofosu-Kusi, 2012, p. 12). 
The researchers used the photos to record and extend their detailed ethnography 
and to deepen their discussions with the children and the insights they shared with 
them into their hard daily lives. Too many children were chasing too few 
opportunities to work.  
The disposability of the children's labor constantly threatens even the most 
basic and tenuous forms of work security, while the exclusionary practices of 
older, adult informal workers means they must work within spatially restricted 
order governed by the social regulation of space and gender (Mizen and 
Ofosu-Kusi, 2012, p. 46).  
The second point (even if there is reality, how can we know or prove what we know?) 
is answered by the theory/practice contradiction. This means that even if researchers 
deny an independent universal reality, they still rely on the printed word, they send 
emails and publish journal papers. By assuming in practice that their words, 
language and meanings can be read more or less intact anywhere, they accept and 
rely on universal reality even if in theory they deny it. By signing their work, they 
claim not only authorship and defense against plagiarism, but also the certainty that 
their own identity exists and continues across time and space. To reduce 
interviewees’ accounts into social or moral constructs (for example, Silverman, 2009, 
pp. 138-45) yet to treat their own text as authentic direct communication sets up 
contradictory double standards. Critical realism aims to resolve such theory/practice 
contradictions by endorsing reality, and thereby the practical relevance of our 





[B] Social science and philosophy 
 
Readers may be thinking that this chapter is less about social science than about 
philosophy and so is not suitable for this encyclopedia. The chapter definitely does 
not aim to add in unnecessary philosophy and confusions. Instead, it is concerned 
with the practical work of unraveling basic and inescapable philosophical questions 
about being and doing, which are integral to all social science. When the ideas are 
ignored, they are left to exert their powerful underlying influences unnoticed and 
unchallenged. The philosopher Mary Midgley (1996) compares philosophy with 
plumbing, which is ignored until the taps and drains stop working, resulting in leaks 
and floods. The contradictions noted earlier are like taken-for-granted but 
disconnected pipes and blocked drains, which urgently need to be sorted, as this 
chapter aims to do.  
 
 
[B] The epistemic fallacy 
 
When critical realism works to resolve differences between positivism and 
interpretivism by drawing them together, a first step is to note how both of them 
collapse being into thinking (the epistemic fallacy), things into thoughts, real children 
wholly into perceptions of them. Interpretivists do so by their emphasis on 
perceptions, interpretations and theories (thinking). Positivists do so by collapsing 
observed or reported realities (such as children’s daily experiences, living, doing and 
being) into data, graphs, statistics, variables and the results of tests and 
experiments. All of these translate the original being into words and numbers 
(thoughts). While this is inevitable in research reports, there is the risk that 
researchers’ representations are mistaken for the original reality or are more highly 
valued than that.  
Long academic traditions favor the epistemic fallacy, which sets thinking over being. 
Descartes, for example, hoped to prove his own existence, and by extension any 
other being, by asserting, “I think therefore I am”. His egoism, which collapsed reality 
into his own perceptions, has gradually been challenged. Yet the view still 
predominates that reality can only be known and translated through the human mind. 
Critical realism emphasizes that social reality is concept-dependent but is not 
exhausted by concepts. Instead reality extends independently in time and space far 
beyond our concepts of it, as geographers recognize when they accept that the 
communities they research continue to exist before and after their visits. Critical 
realism does not try to invent new problems. Instead it works to unravel and resolve 
them, and to show how seemingly disconnected though widely held views (such as 
positivism and interpretivism) can both logically be held.     
 
 
[B] The possibility of naturalism; closed and open systems  
 
As already mentioned, scientism mistakenly assumes that natural and social science 
methods can be identical. Critics of scientism tend to assert that natural science 
deals with things and is very different from social science, which deals with ideas. 
However, each one deals with both things and with ideas when they explain and link 
causes to effects through the imaginative leap towards an abstract hypothesis. 
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Newton’s theory of gravity and Darwin’s theory of natural selection are examples. 
These invisible causal powers can never be directly sensed or proved; they are only 
known in their visible effects, and as reliable explanations that have not yet been 
disproved. Critical realism therefore recognizes the possibility of naturalism 
(Bhaskar, 1998), that there can be unity though not uniformity between the methods 
of the natural and social sciences.  
Newton moved beyond observing falling objects to theorize a hidden power, gravity, 
which causes the falling. Similarly, it is a strength not a weakness or “bias” in social 
science to trace the powerful, unseen, abstract, structural causes. These include 
class, race, gender and, as Leena Alanen and Berry Mayall contend (2001), 
generation, in how they are associated with children’s higher or lower levels of health 
or educational success.    
To stop analysis at the level of observing and describing would be like trying to trace 
the causes of the falling within the observed objects or in the patterns between them. 
Similarly, studies of poverty would search for its causes in many variables, such as 
types of housing, diet, parenting or schooling. Yet this can confuse correlation with 
cause and miss deeper causal analysis.  
Powerful as gravity is, it cannot have total or one hundred percent effects. Birds, 
planes and spiraling leaves show the counteracting powers of flight, engines and air 
currents. However, although they defy gravity they do not disprove it. Similarly, social 
causes do not have one hundred per cent effect. Some disadvantaged children are 
very successful at school. They defy adverse structures of poverty and inequality but 
they do not therefore disprove them. 
Critical realism clarifies this confusion. It contrasts closed systems, which have a 
single overwhelming force and almost never occur, with open systems, when two or 
more causal powers compete. Once complex uncertainties in natural science are 
accepted, then complex ones can be more accepted in the social sciences too.    
It is therefore illogical of critics of social theories to assume that exceptions, such as 
the rare disadvantaged children who are highly successful, can disprove and dismiss 
theories about class as simply “weak and politically biased”. “If these children can 
succeed,” critics argue, “it proves anyone can if they only try hard enough. The 
problem is not inequality, but lack of personal ambition and effort.” Like the American 
dream, this view reduces problems of political structures into personal (in)abilities, 
and blames those who fail. Yet this sets unrealistic, hundred per cent closed system 
standards of proof of social theories. And social science involves many more 
competing forces in complex open systems than the natural sciences do. It is 
therefore even more logical to accept that there are open systems in the social 
sciences than in the natural sciences. Like evolution, class structures are 
determining, they explain and influence events, but they are not determinist; they do 
not wholly control them. When disadvantaged children succeed at school, structures 
such as class may be countered by chance, or by high standards of teaching, by 
friendships and other influences, whereas without these influences many other 
children who work equally hard will fail.  
Social and natural unseen causal powers are only known through their observed 
effects. Social powers are apparent in social behaviors, policies and outcomes. The 
possibility of naturalism opens social science to being more widely accepted as able 
to produce reliable evidence, analysis and conclusions to inform policy and public 





[B] Polyvalence and depth realism 
 
Darwin and Newton moved beyond the obvious and visible into the controversial and 
invisible. Darwin’s theory of invisible natural selection outraged public and religious 
belief that humans are created by God and not “descended from apes”. For millennia 
everyone believed Aristotle’s view that stones fall because of the power within them, 
their gravitas. Newton challenged not only Aristotle, but also the conservative view 
that we must respect tradition instead of relying on our own experience and 
imagination. 
There are two reasons for emphasizing these points in relation to children’s 
geography. First, controversy and politics can arise in both the natural and social 
sciences. Second, ever since Plato, philosophers have stressed that we must adhere 
to the visible and present and never study “what is not”. Bhaskar (2008) terms this 
monovalence or the single value of the present. This continues today in the stress on 
(visible) evidence. Yet Newton and Darwin give a few of many examples of the need 
to look below visible evidence to what seems to be missing in invisible real causes. 
Polyvalence analyses both visible and invisible, presence and seeming absence. 
Tamaki Yoshida’s (2011) study of physical punishment in primary schools in Dar-e-
Salaam Tanzania shows how critical realism attends to depth realism or the three 
layers of reality: actual, empirical and real. The empirical layer involves how we 
sense, observe, record and interpret experiences. During interviews, children 
expressed their pain after they were punished by having to kneel for hours on the 
hard floor.  
 
Then tomorrow, tomorrow when you wake up these legs would hurt so much 
that you cannot even go to school. Because everywhere in your legs would 
hurt (Yoshida, 2011, p. 160).  
 
The children also talked about the anger and potential violence generated among 
them by such punishment. Teachers spoke of hope and enthusiasm in their work but 
also of the severe difficulties of controlling classes of around 100 children in hot 
crowded rooms with few teaching resources. Those who failed the end of year 
exams had to repeat the year, possibly several times, so that each class included a 
range of age groups. This repetition seriously reduced families’ income when they 
had to pay for unhelpful schooling, and when children who were at school were not 
being paid workers. Poverty and high unemployment rates increased parents’ and 
children’s great anxiety that the children should do well at school in order to increase 
their chance of finding reasonably paid work afterwards. However, schools had no 
resources for the work of identifying learning difficulties such as dyslexia, or for 
skilled remedial help for the many children with extra learning needs, or for those 
who missed weeks and months of school because of illness or family crises. 
Children were punished for the failings of the schools and education systems. Long-
term devastating effects included a widespread sense of shame and hopelessness. 
Robert Serpell (1993) analyzed meanings of children’s “intelligence” in several 
African languages. He showed how nzelu involved three dimensions, of wisdom, 
cleverness and responsibility, all vital for the well-being of rural Zambian 
communities. Sadly, the local schools did not respect or nurture these capacities, 
and they left 80-95 per cent of young people and adults Serpell contacted feeling 
that they were “brainless” failures.  
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  The second visible actual layer involves the people, things and events that actually 
existed or occurred and could be observed. Besides the empirical and actual levels 
is the deeper third level of real causal structures, real because like gravity and 
evolution, they create and are known by their effects. They include politics and 
economics. In 2003, an estimated 92 per cent of Tanzania’s urban population lived in 
slums, 11 million people (Davis, 2006: 24; UN-HABITAT, 2003). Slums involve 
unplanned, insecure housing that can be demolished at any time, from a legacy of 
Black Africans not being allowed to own land or be recognized as citizens with rights. 
Slums lack piped utilities and sewage, while mega-tons of rubbish lie uncollected 
(Davis, 2006), contrary to children’s basic health rights (UNCRC, 1989, Article 24). 
Yoshida’s ethnography described her experiences of extremely inefficient housing, 
electricity, transport and education administration services in the city. However, the 
structural causes extend far beyond Africa. When granting loans to countries (and so 
trapping them more deeply into debt), the USA-based World Bank forces strict limits 
to their public services budgets. African schools are then grossly underfunded, with 
under-paid teachers in under-resourced classes. In countless ways, children’s daily 
lives are tightly constrained by national and global pressures. 
Real structures include: unequal power between nations, historical legacies of violent 
empires, and neoliberal policies to promote commerce and to cut and privatize state 
services including schools. Though mainly invisible and seemingly absent, real 
political structures are a vital part of explanations about daily life (Archer, 2003; 
Harvey, 2005, 2012; Keenan, 2012; Mason, 2012; Mizen and Wokowitz, 2012; 
Nadesan; Nieuwenhuys, 2005; Qvortrup, 2005; Serpel, 1993; Wacquant, 2009; 
Young Lives, 2014). 
 
  
[B] Structure and agency, natural necessity and power 
   
Critical realism analyses how agents draw on structures, and are powerfully enabled 
but also constrained by them. The underlying structures in the previous section 
precede individual agents yet are also constantly reproduced and refined by and 
through them (Bhaskar, 2008; Archer, 2003). To recognize the great power of 
adverse structures can increase respect for the relatively few agents who manage to 
surpass them, as when children succeed educationally despite severe economic 
disadvantage. Causes can also include people’s agency in their hopes and 
intentions, which become real when they have actual outcomes.  
Structures and agents express their natural necessity. In humans that is the reality of 
our natural-social essentially moral human being that compels us into thought and 
action. From the first years (Dunn 2004; Alderson 2014), children and adults see 
people, things and events largely in moral terms of benefit, respect and justice 
(Maybin, 2014). Social research is therefore misguided and distorted if it attempts to 
be “objective” by setting morality aside. Moral questions are central not only to all 
methods through the research process (Alderson and Morrow, 2011) but also to all 
the research topics and analyses (Sayer, 2011).  
Children’s geographies are imbued with moral questions, such as of justice. 
However, political research, for example about respecting or withholding the spaces, 
freedoms, rights and resources of people, is mainly about adults, or about younger 
adults versus older ones (such as Harvey, 2012; Howker and Malik, 2010; 
Wacquant, 2009). Mainstream “adult” research reports and debates mainly ignore 
the particular needs, interests and rights of children and young people, although one 
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third of the world’s population, and over one half of the people in Africa  are aged 
under-18 years. The wealth of findings in childhood geographies research could 
greatly inform and expand these debates.  
Conversely, despite repeated urging from Qvortrup (2005) and others, childhood 
research rarely attends to the multi-layered politics and structures that control 
childhoods. Such multi-layered research by Katz (2004) and Nadesan (2010) is fairly 
unusual. So children tend to be doubly excluded from vital debates about policy 
making, when they are ignored in adult-centered work and when childhood research 
is largely apolitical. And yet today’s children will live through the effects of these 
policies for many more decades than will the older adults who dominate today’s 
debates.  
One reason for the exclusions is ambiguity about the politics of children as citizens. 
Most of the related research examines how children learn to become citizens, rather 
than how they are active citizens now in legal, political and economic contexts. 
Another reason is that most childhood research is funded to be conducted with only 
quite small groups of children, and in sheltered rather than openly public settings. 
And large projects such as the longitudinal birth cohorts, which measure and 
describe thousands of childhoods, tend to eschew political analysis, saying that it is 
too early to judge the effects of government policies (for example, Hansen, Joshi,& 
Dex, 2010). The 15-year-long Young Lives (2014) program is unusual in drawing 
together micro and macro, qualitative and quantitative, local and international, 
personal, political and economic levels     
Central to critical realism’s analysis of morality are concerns with power. To avoid a 
common confusion, critical realism separates power1, which is creative emancipatory 
power, from coercive oppressive power2. (The numbers are part of the two terms for 
power, not end notes.) Human beings are seen as constantly aiming to work away 
from power2 and, through power1 towards freedom (Bhaskar 2008). Although rights 
and freedoms are sometimes classed as “Western” values, the wave of mass 
protests demanding freedom and justice around all continents during this century 
has shown how these concerns are universal and greatly involve young people 
(Mason 2012). Yet so far, we know little about important questions of how and when 
their practical political engagement begins in childhood, although awareness begins 
very early (Connolly, Kelly & Smith, 2009).  
 
 
[B] Predicting the future 
 
Natural science involves making reliable predictions based on replicable 
experiments. Social scientists hesitate to predict futures, when these are likely to be 
disproved quickly by uncertain and complex open social systems and unpredictable 
human agency. Their critics then ask, “What is the point of social research if it can 
tell us nothing about the future?” However, natural scientists’ predictions are also 
limited. For example, they cannot be certain about the weather, and if it will rain at a 
certain time and place weeks ahead. Yet they can predict far longer-term climate 
change trends (with agreement among 97% of climate scientists) in that if fossil fuel 
emissions continue to increase there will be catastrophic global warming (IPCC, 
2014).  
There are similar limits in social science predictions. Small and individual futures, the 
empirical and actual (like local weather), cannot certainly be predicted. But deep 
third level structural trends (like global climate change) may partially be foreseen 
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although, as with natural science, exact rates and dates remain uncertain. David 
Harvey (2005), Naomi Klein (2007) and others predicted the structural series of 
global financial crises and neoliberal take-overs. Jeremy Keenan (2012) traced 
decades of adverse Western political and economic interventions in Algeria, which 
drove the underlying trends that constructed the “war on terror” there. These deeper 
causal analyses help to explain the present predicaments of many of Africa’s 
children and young people, and their likely futures of increasing inequality and 
poverty, protest, violence and forced migration unless changes occur at underlying 
structural levels. Critical realism’s three layers of reality can help to increase areas of 
certainty.  
There is pessimism among childhood researchers about children being ignored in 
national and global politics (Smith and Greene, 2014). That points to important 
reasons for geographers to connect their macro and micro studies into political 
strictures and long-term trends. These include: to begin to repair serious, unjust 
omissions of children from global policy; to understand and explain “adult” 
researchers’ actual and empirical observations more deeply and accurately by also 
taking account of children; to avoid superficial and misleading adult-centered 
analysis; to show the real value of research about children’s views, experiences and 
rights; to inform present and future policy making more fully and accurately.      
  
 
[B] Absence, change and emergence  
   
Research with children tends to be like snapshots, fixed into time and set age 
groups, in contrast to films that follow process and dynamic change over time. Even 
longitudinal projects may be disjointed when they review children at intervals every 
few years. To trace processes, three concepts in critical realism can be particularly 
useful. These are absence, change and emergence.   
Plato’s veto on studying non-being or absence has been mentioned. Awareness of 
absence as well as presence is vital for understanding change. Absence includes all 
that ever was, or will be, or might have been, or might be, or is elsewhere. Absence 
includes ignorance (absent knowledge) and unmet need. Bhaskar gives the example 
of the monsoon that never arrives so that the crops fail. Absence is an almost infinite 
ocean, whereas the fleeting present moment, the positive, is “a tiny, but important, 
ripple on the surface of the sea of negativity” (Bhaskar (2008, p. 5).  
Negativity includes the vital work of absenting absence, such as when learning 
absents ignorance, food negates hunger or clean water prevents disease. A world 
packed with presence has no spaces for movement, for change or alternatives. Yet 
as children become young people and then adults, we have to recognize their 
“begoing”, the gaps and spaces, losses and absences left behind, as well as the so-
far empty spaces and potential they move into. For example, as they move towards 
greater independence, they leave behind the very close intimacy with those who 
care for them, which they enjoyed as babies.   
To understand change involves seeing how it contrasts with difference. For instance, 
if one child leaves a room and another child enters it, a different child is in the room 
but there has not been transformative change. Real change occurs when, for 
example, a child learns to read; she becomes more independent, less reliant on 
others to read stories or instructions or websites to her. Her relationships and 
identity, her scope for making choices and her understanding of the world are 
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transformed. Another example is when children start to use public transport on their 
own and can roam far more freely and confidently. 
Bhaskar (2008) considers that denial of absence and of begoing prevents us from 
understanding change and becoming. Instead, for millennia, researchers have 
concentrated on difference, on classifying and grouping things, species, age-groups 
and other concepts, on identifying differences between the one and the many. 
Taxonomy assigns objects and people into fixed groups according to their function. 
Child/adult, reason/emotion, mind/body are among the countless resulting 
dichotomies that dominate our thinking.  
In contrast, research about change involves recognizing both continuity and 
transformation or the one and the other. In growing older, the child continues to be 
the same one person as well as the other different person. Child and adult can be 
seen as dynamic, dialectical aspects of the same person, with many continuities as 
well as differences. We are both our past and present and becoming selves in 
constantly changing patterns.  
This continuity can be seen as emergence. Just as water emerges from hydrogen 
and oxygen, so consciousness emerges from mind, which emerges from brain, 
which emerges from body. They cannot be collapsed or separated back into their 
original elements although they remain interacting and interdependent, in dialectical 
relationships. Since change, emergence and personal and political transformation 
are so central to childhood and to child-adult relations, critical realism offers crucial 
insights for researching them, though there is space here only to outline these ideas 
briefly (see Bhaskar, 2008; Alderson, 2013).        
     
 
[A] Macro and micro levels in research 
 
It is not easy for childhood researchers working on small-scale short studies to set 
their qualitative material into broader political contexts. One way to do so is to “nest” 
their work into literature reviews and references to larger projects. Another is to show 
how their research can involve larger levels of analysis. For example, a study of 
preschools can refer to how and why they were set up and to their policy contexts, 
such as the education of future workers and consumers or promotion of mothers’ 
fuller employment, and to examine how these aims affect the children and their daily 
routines.  
Even topics as domestic as nannies, may involve global economics. Olga 
Nieuwenhuys (2005, p. 168) showed how a vast pyramid of global labour and power, 
wealth and care, is invisibly displaced upwards, supported by the poorest children at 
the base. Filipino nannies on low wages in California are subsidised by the lower 
paid women who care for the nannies’ children in the Philippines. In turn, unpaid 
adults and children care for these women’s children.   
Critical realism offers two major ways of organizing and synthesizing these kinds of 
diverse and wide-ranging materials: four planar social being and MELD, which will 
now be reviewed.  
 
 
[B] Four planar social being 
 
Critical realism sets human life into four areas or planes of social being. The first 
plane is our material bodies in relation to nature. Social researchers tend to 
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emphasize the mental over the physical, our social and mental understanding, 
manipulation and presentation of our bodies over our physical sensations and animal 
needs. This aspect of the epistemic fallacy (to set the mental over the physical) is 
part of the general undervaluing of nature since the Enlightenment, which has led 
among many other effects to current ecological crises (Bhaskar, et al., 2010; IPCC, 
2014). Mizen and Ofosu-Kusi (2013, p. 15) illustrate critical realism’s attention to real 
bodies and nature in their unusually evocative physical and sensuous description of 
life in a slum in Accra Ghana that houses up to 40,000 people.    
 
[N]either its myriad shacks nor extensive network of alleyways and footpaths 
appear on city maps...[The slum] is a hive of industry with its metal recycling 
businesses, fruit and vegetable markets, street vendors, waste pickers, and 
auto parts and repair shops, the most visible signs of its importance as a 
place of work. Ringed to the west by the river Odaw, its foul-smelling and dark 
viscous contents somehow edging downstream into the now-toxic Korle 
Lagoon, parts of the settlement are regularly flooded during the rainy season. 
On occasions when the fetid contents of the river invade the settlement, it 
leaves behind torpid pools of evaporating water that harbour mosquitoes and 
water-borne diseases. There is no legal supply of mains electricity, running 
water, sewerage system or organized public waste collection. Emanating from 
the scattered detritus, discarded human and animal faeces, smouldering 
rubbish, primitive toilets and nearby vehicles, the settlement is cloaked by foul 
odours carried on the warm winds blowing in from the nearby Gulf of Guinea. 
 
Young children who have not yet acquired immunity to infections are most at risk of 
disease when they play in the filthy alleyways. Over 50 percent of all people now live 
in cities, and dominant economic views encourage this migration despite the 
absence of planning to meet the basic needs of many millions. However, realistic 
micro studies of children’s physical lives in this “planet of slums” (Davis, 2006) can 
crucially inform economic and political debates.   
 The second social plane is interpersonal relationships, and Mizen and Ofosu-Kusi 
(2010, p. 444) again illustrate how critical realism can inform childhood studies. They 
portray the noble, generous agency, the hardiness, and also the vulnerability and 
reliance on interdependent relationships of young people aged 13-15 years in the 
slums. Erico said: 
 
A friend may ask you for something and when you refuse, one day you will 
also be in need and if your friend does not help you, you may think your friend 
hates you, but it is because of what you did, so you must always help, so that 
one day your friend can help you.   
 
The third plane is social structures. Critical realist Douglas Porpora (1998, p. 339-55) 
identified different concepts of social structures. Structures may be seen as patterns 
of aggregate behavior that are stable over time. Childhood is an example, but this 
agency-dominated concept suggests that structures endure through repeated 
“childish” and “adultish” behaviors. It does not explain how mature children (and 
immature adults) step inside or outside these conventions.  
Another concept emphasizes culture, rules and resources that generate systems and 
relationships, reproduced across time and space while varying around the world. 
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Again, agents seem to have undue power to choose between structures, whereas 
millions are trapped unwillingly into oppression and disadvantage.  
An alternative concept sees structures as law-like regularities that govern the 
behavior of social facts. Structural functionalists observe and measure many 
behaviors before searching for regularities that will indicate almost inevitable 
underlying structures, such as poverty or “social capital” or crime (Cunha, Heckman 
and Schennach, 2010; Dercon and Singh 2011). Porpora questions how this concept 
of structure can predominate so much over agency, and over individuals’ beliefs, 
decisions and psychology.   
Finally, Porpora’s preferred model is social structures seen as systems of human 
relations among social positions. Rather than being underlying or external rules to be 
invoked, structures exist as powerful and enduring systems and positions in and 
through social relations, though they far precede and outlast individual agents. 
These structures include modes of production, domination, competition, exploitation 
and unequal social positions between classes and age groups. “Modes of 
production” and reproduction during childhood include parents bearing and caring for 
their children, and teachers instructing and socializing them to produce the finished 
adults. This broad concept of powerful structures allows for individual variety, and 
interactions, and resistance. And it also recognizes tensions between competing 
structures within open social systems.               
Adversity can starkly reveal inexorable social and physical structures. The 
challenges of living in the Accra slum violently confronted the children with the social 
structures of gross poverty and inequality, and the many absences of unmet needs 
in the chaotic unplanned city spaces, the dangerously unregulated employment and 
the unmanaged refuse, traffic, housing and crime. In contrast, in well-organized 
wealthy city spaces, the same dangerous social structures tend to be concealed and 
smoothly managed so that citizens need hardly to be aware of them. These range 
from piped utilities to police protection, from city planning to massive systems for 
delivering necessary goods and removing unwanted waste.  
The fourth plane of social being is inner being and flourishing and the kinds of 
societies, intergenerational relations, cities and schools that either undermine or 
promote this flourishing. The fourth plane involves further huge topics for research 
working with and for children and young people, and there is space here only to 





MELD offers another framework for organizing and explaining complex research and 
for relating micro data into macro contexts. MELD is an acronym for four stages of 
social process, and dynamic change, and how one stage pushes inevitably forward 
into the next stage over time. Based on Hegel’s three-part dialectic (thesis, 
antithesis, synthesis), MELD expands dialectic into four parts and is open to diverse 
meanings and uses.   
1M stands for first moment, nonidentity and absence. It recognizes the independent, 
intransitive being that exists beyond transitive thinking (see above). This links to 
anthropologists’ standing back, trying to respect others on their own terms, to avoid 
imposing the observers’ thinking and classifying onto these independent beings. 
Critical realists try to avoid anthropism, which reduces all being (all nature and other 
species) into human being and thinking. Childhood researchers also aim to move 
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beyond adultism, which assumes that adults are at the centre of the meaning, 
purpose and functioning of the cosmos, with childhood as merely a prelude, when 
instead they listen to children and try to see observed experiences from their 
viewpoints. Robert Adomo (2013) mentions sacred aspects of inalienable human 
dignity and our need, beyond precise verbal reason, partly to apprehend it intuitively.   
1M is concerned with the actual, the empirical and also the seemingly absent reality. 
Childhood is often seen as absence, or an emptiness of the powers and qualities 
that adults have. Yoshida’s research in Tanzanian schools showed how children are 
expected to be silent and ‘empty’ in the sense that in Swahili, watu wazima means 
full people or adults. Yoshida researched children’s own views, their moral agency 
and the many ways in which their hard work at school and at home tended to be 
unnoticed by adults. Nieuwenhuys’s (2005) pyramid of global labour (see above) is 
another example of research that moves beyond the actual and empirical lives of 
Californian children into the hidden subsidies taken from unpaid childminders in the 
Philippines.   
2E is second edge, negativity and power2. Like Hegel’s second stage of antithesis, 
2E explores problems, needs and contradictions. The aim is to begin to intervene 
and to seek to resolve contradictions in research, or to plan and implement new 
policies. The power, accuracy and relevance of 2E depend on thorough questioning 
at 1M. One practical example of 2E was when some of the Tanzanian teachers and 
parents raised funds to provide a daily porridge meal to help the hungry children to 
concentrate more in class (Yoshida, 2011, p. 181).   
3L, third level, is about building a more inclusive open totality than Hegel’s closed 
third stage of synthesis envisaged. In 3L, nothing is infinite, fixed or final. Totalities 
are internally connected and integrated, but they are also always partial and they 
interact with other totalities: a (total) child, in a family, in a class, in a school, in a 
district, a country and the world of many other totalities in open systems. Again, 
researchers’ and policy makers’ understanding and responses to totalities depend on 
the informed care previously taken at 1M and 2E. If they leapt earlier to premature 
misunderstandings, then splits, fragmentation, unresolved contradictions and 
continued violence are likely to follow. 
4D, fourth dimension, involves self-transformative agency and power1, through 
desire for change and praxis, seeking to move away from power2 and towards a 
society where “the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all” (Marx and Engles, 1848). This crucially involves critical new self-
awareness, gained through the MELD process, which can impel agents to begin 
again at 1M in new cycles.  
Yoshida (2011) shows how MELD can trace positive or negative cycles. False beliefs 
at 1M, of children’s assumed deficits, can lead on at 2E to punitive power2 policies 
and interventions. These can reinforce 3L oppressive systems and totalities and 
lead, at 4L, to denial of the critical personal and political awareness that can 
transform adverse power relations. Then the self remains alienated and detotalised 
in MELD and on the four planar social being. Among many examples are children’s 
internalized deep feelings of shame, pain and fear when they are physically 
punished. Yoshida gave a more political example when adults and children held a 
big protest about the Dar es Salam council’s plan to double the daladala (public 
minibus) fares, until the police dispersed them with teargas. Some children had to 
travel many dangerous miles to school. The buses greatly increased their freedom 
and autonomy, whereas higher fares posed serious problems for them. The 
authorities missed the chance that the protests raised of revising their policies. Yet 
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they were constrained by higher powers such as the World Bank. Real 
transformation has to happen at every level. .  
Dynamic MELD offers ways to analyze how benign progress but also malign cycles 
drive inexorably on from one moment to the next. Politicians are often criticized for 
making policies that harm children. MELD analyses how directions cannot simply be 
changed. It is necessary to begin the whole process again by careful review at initial 
1M if we are to change society, people and structures, and to avoid starting at 2E or 
3L by trying to paste superficially different models on to past ones.        
 
 
[A] Conclusion  
 
This chapter has aimed to highlight major current problems and gaps in social 
research, and to outline a few from many ideas in critical realism that can help to 
resolve these problems and contradictions. Although the chapter has involved 
unraveling some underlying philosophical complications, such as between 
empiricists and interpretivists, the purpose has been practical: to enable 
geographers of children and young people to design, analyze and report more 
logical, realistic research, intended to inform policies and practices to benefit 
children. Examples reviewed include four planar social being, which offers ways to 
synthesize a wide range of relevant micro and macro material even in brief small-
scale studies. In the four stage MELD: 1M lays the basis for explanatory social 
science critique of process over time; 2E pushes towards concrete visions for the 
future; 3L theorizes transition and change, totalities, and interactions between 
agency and structures, theory and practice that impel analyses into 4D, which can 
then involve reflective transformation. 
This chapter has also briefly reviewed how dichotomies can be reframed as 
interacting dialectics, how invisible underlying causes can be analyzed, the need to 
avoid cultural relativism, so that due account can be taken of the morality that is 
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